Ties that bind:Network redistributive pressure and economic decisions in village economies by Di Falco, Salvatore et al.
Ties that Bind: Network Redistributive Pressure and 
Economic Decisions in Village Economies+ 
Salvatore Di Falco* 
(University of Geneva, Switzerland) 
Francesco Feri 
(Royal Holloway, University of London, UK and University of Trieste) 
Paolo Pin 
(Bocconi University and IGIER, Italy) 
Xavier Vollenweider 
(London School of Economics, UK) 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we identify some of the economic implications of the pressure to share 
resources within a social network. Through a set of field experiments in rural 
Tanzania we randomly increased the expected harvest of the treatment group by the 
assignment of an improved and much more productive variety of maize. We find that 
treated individuals reduced the interaction with their social network by discussing 
with fewer people in the village the type of seed they received, so as not to reveal 
their improved seed. We also find that treated individuals reduced labor input by 
asking fewer people in the village to work on their farm during the growing season 
and, as a result, obtained fewer actual harvest gains.  
 
Keywords: Networks, Field Experiment, Social Norms, Redistributive pressure, Tanzania 
JEL: O12, O13, C93, H26, Z13 
 
 
*Contact author. Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and 
Management, University of Geneva, 40 Boulevard du Pont d’Arve 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. 
+ We would like to thank the Editor in charge (Nathan Nunn) and two anonymous reviewers for the 
extremely useful comments and suggestions. We also would like to thank Arild Angelsen, Abigail 
Barr, Simone Bertoli, Erwin Bulte, Luigi Butera, Gary Charness, Giacomo De Giorgi, Christian 
Ghiglino, Menale Kassie, John List, Razack Lokina, Dil Rahut, Matthias Sutter, Nicole Tabasso, 
Daniel Tennenbaum, Björn Vollan and seminar participants at the Autonoma de Barcelona, University 
of Chicago, Université d’Auvergne, University of Exeter, University of Lyon, University of Oxford 
(CSAE 2015 meeting), University of Innsbruck and Royal Holloway University of London for very 
useful comments and suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge financial support provided by 
CIMMYT. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 1 
 
Ties that Bind: Network Redistributive Pressure and 
Economic Decisions in Village Economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we identify some of the economic implications of the pressure to share 
resources within a social network. Through a set of field experiments in rural 
Tanzania we randomly increased the expected harvest of the treatment group by the 
assignment of an improved and much more productive variety of maize. We find that 
treated individuals reduced the interaction with their social network by discussing 
with fewer people in the village the type of seed they received, so as not to reveal 
their improved seed. We also find that treated individuals reduced labor input by 
asking fewer people in the village to work on their farm during the growing season 
and, as a result, obtained fewer actual harvest gains.  
 
Keywords: Networks, Field Experiment, Social Norms, Redistributive Pressure, Tanzania 
JEL: O12, O13, C93, H26, Z13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
1 Introduction 
Social networks – a key component of social capital – play an important role for the 
livelihood and development prospects of communities in the developing world.1 They 
provide informal insurance and credit when markets are imperfect or absent (e.g. 
Udry, 1990; Rosenzweig, 1988; Fafchamps, 1992; Greif 1993, Coate and Ravallion, 
1993; Townsend, 1994, Udry, 1994, Anderson and Baland, 2002, Ligon et al. 2002, 
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Kinnan and Townsend, 2012, Attanasio et. al., 2012), 
facilitate technology diffusion (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010) 
and provide opportunities for human capital investment and resource redistribution 
(Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009; Angelucci et al., 2010).2 One of the quintessential 
characteristics of social network relations is the social norm of sharing that is 
experienced by its members. The more successful members must help the least 
successful members of the social network (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994).3 They 
may also be requested to contribute more to local public goods (Olken and Singhal, 
2011). Resource redistribution within the network can, therefore, be characterized like 
an informal redistributive tax (Platteau, 2000; Baland et al., 2011; Squires, 2016). 
And like a tax it may trigger an evasive response. This view is supported by recent 
experimental evidence (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016, Beekman et al. 2015; Boltz et al.; 
                                                             
1 See Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) and Jackson (2008) for a review. 
2 Households’ expectations of future assistance and transfers are key motivators behind participation in 
these networks. Other explanations such as altruism, guilt and potential social sanctions also seem to 
play an important role in shaping individual interactions in networks (Platteau 2000, Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2001, Barr and Stein 2008, Leider et al., 2009, Alger and Weibull 2010, Ligon and 
Schechter, 2012).  
3 Scott (1975) and Platteau (1991) refer to the concept of the ‘moral economy.’ Scott (1985) – cited in 
Platteau (2014) – noted that help to the poorer was less from a sense of liberality but from 
redistributive pressure. 
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2016).4 An underexplored research question is to what extent this evasive response 
may correspond to ill-suited economic decisions. For instance, would individuals 
reduce economically profitable social interactions so as to prevent resource sharing 
with their social network? In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by exploring the 
economic implications of a social network’s redistributive pressure.  
We designed a set of field experiments in rural Tanzania that exploited the differential 
productivity of maize seeds. We randomly assigned to the treatment group a more 
productive, improved variety of maize. The control group received a common 
traditional lower yielding variety. According to agronomic trials in research stations 
the improved varieties of maize may produce yields up to five times larger than the 
traditional variety (Kanyeka, Kamala and Kasuga, 2007). Improved maize thus 
substantially raises the expected harvest and so expected income of the treatment 
group as compared to the control group. We tested if the treated subjects altered some 
dimensions of their social interactions that would make their expected increased 
income known or visible to the others.5 We find that the individuals in the treatment 
group, as compared to the control group, informed fewer people in the village about 
the seeds they received and asked fewer people in the village for help on their farms.6 
We also find that these effects are greater when the ex-ante size of the participant’s 
                                                             
4 In the context of an experimental study of involuntary giving, similar findings have emerged. Dana et 
al. (2006), for instance, found that 28% of senders in a standard dictator game preferred to hide at a 
cost rather than to send nothing to the receivers. 
5 An alternative would have been to provide farmers with an unconditional cash transfer. Cash is, 
however, easier to conceal than seeds. This would have made the detection of potential evasive 
behavior more difficult. Moreover, hiding from the network comes with a cost (e.g., having less help in 
the farm). Our design allows us to capture both of these aspects.   
6 The exact survey questions are respectively: with how many people in the village did you discuss the 
type of seeds since you received them? And since you received the seeds, how many people from your 
village did you ask for help on your farm? It should be stressed that the improved seeds do not require 
less labor. Hence the reduced interaction is not a result of a lower labor requirement. This issue is 
further addressed later on in the paper.  
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social network is larger, as measured by the number of relatives living in the village.7 
Reliance on the social network for help on one’s farm has potential economic 
implications. In rural Tanzania, like in many parts of the developing world, farming is 
usually a family business. All members of a household are, normally, involved in 
different farming activities (e.g., soil preparation, sowing, weeding, fertilizer 
application, harvesting, threshing). Village social networks are an effective way of 
expanding labor for the production process. We, indeed, find that the size of the 
network affects the quantity of maize harvested. While the improved seed does 
increase yields, this beneficial effect declines as the number of relatives in the village 
rise. This effect is not found for the control group with the traditional maize variety.  
Our results contribute to two broad strands of literature. The first is the small but 
expanding literature linking social networks to input misallocation (Banerjee and 
Munshi, 2004; Di Falco and Bulte, 2011; Baland et al. 2015; Squires, 2015; Munshi 
and Rosenzweig, 2016). This paper provides field evidence showing that labor input 
is affected by redistributive pressure. The second strand of related literature is on 
social pressure and involuntary giving (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Dana et al. 
2006; Landry et al., 2006; Dellavigna et al., 2012; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016, Squires, 
2016). This paper confirms some of the key findings in this area (e.g., social pressure 
increases giving) by providing field evidence on social network redistributive 
pressure in the developing world. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a description of the study 
area and key variables, and the design of the field experiment. In Sections 3 and 4, we 
                                                             
7 The exact survey question is: how many of your relatives are living in this village? The number of 
relatives living in the same village is our measure of a subject’s social network. This is consistent 
with previous work (e.g., Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016). We use the terms 
number of relatives in the village, village network and social network interchangeably in this paper.  
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present and discuss the empirical strategy and the results. Then, in Section 5 we 
conclude the paper by offering some final remarks. In the Appendices we provide 
additional tables and a detailed description of the experimental setup. 
2 Description, design and procedures  
We conducted a set of field experiments in fifteen villages located in two maize 
growing areas in the South-East (Morogoro) and in the North (Karatu) of rural 
Tanzania. These villages may be thought of as fairly isolated, self-contained, units as 
they are situated far from each other. Approximately 10 per cent of farmers in each 
village, a total of 314 farmers, took part in the experiments.8 Working with a 
relatively small fraction of farmers per village is necessary to prevent the 
experimental activity from becoming too disruptive to village life. It also reduces the 
likelihood of general equilibrium effects such as changes in local labor and maize 
markets.9 People living in these areas are self-subsistence farmers with crops that are 
mostly consumed within the household and any surplus marketed. Table 1 describes 
the main characteristics of the farmers (and their farms) participating in the 
experiment. 148 farmers (47% of the sample) randomly received the improved seeds. 
The remaining 166 were randomly assigned to the control group (53% of the sample). 
The average participant’s network size is 9.2 relatives within the village (with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 33) and 5.7 relatives in other villages. The average 
household size is 4.95 (with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 10) with the average 
head of the household 44 years old, of which 60% had some education. Some of the 
                                                             
8 When we designed the experiment, we did a standard power calculation. Considering a significance 
level alpha of 0.05, 80 per cent power, an effect of half a standard deviation, and an estimated intra-
cluster correlation of 0.036, we obtained a needed estimated sample size of 161.  
9 Providing a large part of the village with improved seeds would have increased substantially the 
aggregate maize production that would have eventually been traded on the local market. 
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household heads in the sample are also village leaders (17%). Only 11% of the farm 
household heads are female. The average farm size is 1.4 ha and 23% of households 
own an ox.  
[Table 1 – About here] 
Bags containing 1 kilogram of improved maize seeds were randomly allocated to 47 
percent of the sample. The control group received, instead, bags containing 1 
kilogram of the traditional maize seed variety.10 The improved variety is named 
Situka-M1 and was released in 2001 by the Selian Agricultural Research Institute 
(SARI) in Tanzania. It has a high yield potential of 3-5 ton/ha and its optimal 
production altitude ranges 1000-1500 meters above sea level. The traditional variety 
instead has a yield potential of 0.5-1 ton/ha under similar conditions.11 This relatively 
small quantity of seeds is sufficient for one plot of land of average size. In these 
villages, households have, on average, three plots of half a hectare each. One of these 
plots is always allocated to maize. Farmers planted the received seeds on one of their 
plots and we refer to this as their experimental plot. These are geographically 
scattered and are, on average, 25 minutes walking distance from the village. Very few 
maize plots are located in close proximity of the village. Only 1 per cent of the plots 
are located within 10 minutes walk from the village while more than 20 per cent of 
the plots are located very far away, or more than 35 minutes walk.12 All experimental 
                                                             
10 The balance check for the predetermined variables - the standard test for randomization - is reported 
in Table A1 in appendix A. It shows that there is no evidence of systematic differences between the 
treatment and the control group.  
11 This improved variety is grown in the areas of the experiment and is the second most important open 
pollinated variety (OPV) in the country. About 12% of farmers in the areas of the research used Situka-
M1 during the 2010/11. The variety is tolerant to both drought and pests (e.g., maize streak and grey 
leaf spot diseases). More detail on the varieties and its adoption in rural Tanzania are reported in the 
online appendix. 
12 Vegetables and livestock are normally kept in the plot closest to the homestead. 
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plots had been utilized in the previous growing season also for maize. We can, 
therefore, rule out any strategic consideration in the choice of the plot.  
Our key outcome variables are social interactions among people that would make the 
expected positive income shock known or visible. First, we measure the number of 
people in the village the participant discussed the seeds with after she received them. 
This provides a direct measure of the inclination to share the information about an 
expected larger positive income shock and it could be affected by the size of the 
social network. The second key outcome variable is the number of people in the 
village that are asked to work on the participant’s farm. This social interaction could 
also be affected by the size of the network; a larger network allows one to ask for 
more help from other (perhaps more productive) individuals. Assuming a constant 
marginal cost of asking for help, a larger network could induce more social 
interactions. Yet asking more people in the village for help entails both increased 
visibility and increased potential redistributive pressure.  
 
Asking for help on the farm and informal labor sharing agreements 
It should be noted that in our experimental context asking for help on the farm could 
be part of existing or new informal labor sharing agreements. These agreements are 
different from hiring labor on the local market at given wage. These agreements are in 
fact made among individuals with strong social bonds (e.g., relatives) and imply 
working together in a set of manual agricultural activities such as field preparation, 
planting, weeding and harvesting. Labor sharing agreements are characterized by 
reciprocity, implying that a household that is invited to help expects to be 
reciprocated for a similar task and length of time, and/or will expect a share of the 
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output as compensation. Social sanctions for not reciprocating can be harsh (Bevan 
and Pankhurst, 1996; Krishnan and Sciubba, 2009). There is, moreover, some 
anecdotal evidence that the agreements also have an important insurance component. 
In rural Tanzania, De Weerdt (2001) for instance reported that: ‘a member who has to 
attend a funeral of a close relative, falls sick herself, or has to take care of a sick 
relative for a long time can be excused from her tasks, but still gets her fields attended 
to’ (page. 24).  
We have tested if the reciprocity (or exchanging labor) feature that characterizes labor 
sharing agreement is present in our context. We therefore tested if participant who are 
asking for help on their farm are more likely to help the others on their farms and vice 
versa. We found that this is the case. The correlation coefficient is 0.65 and 
statistically significant. Asking for help and offering help for farming plots with other 
people in the village are strongly correlated.  
 
Procedures 
The successful implementation of the experiment required the collaboration among 
the research team, the main agricultural extension officers operating in the regions 
and the village leaders in all stages of the experiment. In November 2012, the project 
leader met with the extension services in Morogoro and Arusha to discuss the 
possibility of an agricultural experiment in the regions. They were informed that the 
experiment would entail the distribution of maize seeds to a randomly selected group 
of farmers. No information was provided on the type of seeds or the social network 
focus of the research. In December 2012, some members of the research team and the 
extension service officers visited the sites and met the village leaders. From the 
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leaders, we obtained the list of the households living in each village. They were told 
that an agricultural experiment would take place the next rainy season. In early 
January 2013, a baseline survey was undertaken with the randomly selected 
households. Their consent to participate in an agricultural experiment that entailed the 
distribution of maize varieties was explicitly requested. The baseline survey recorded 
all the relevant socio-economic information, agricultural characteristics of the farm 
and the plots. Each household provided information about the size of their village 
network, the type and frequency of actual and potential social interactions in their 
village.   
Selected farmers were informed that they were among a small minority in the village 
to take part in an agricultural experiment that entailed the distribution of maize seeds. 
They were not informed who the other farmers taking part in the experiment were and 
the identity of the farmers who received the seeds was not revealed to the rest of the 
village. Farmers that were not part of the experiment were not informed about the 
research activities. During the second half of January, the seeds were then discreetly 
distributed to the farmers in closed packages by the enumerators. Enumerators 
informed at the delivery what seed (improved or traditional) was provided to the 
farmers. The accuracy of this information was easily verifiable, as the type of seed is 
recognizable by eye.13 In February 2013, at the beginning of the rainy season, farmers 
started planting the seeds on their experimental plots. Between February 2013 and 
July 2013, a number of interactions by mobile phone and in person between the 
enumerators and the farmers took place. Meetings were always held at the 
                                                             
13 Improved seeds have a smooth and regular shape. They are also of different color as they are treated 
with a fungicide to minimize seed loss during storage. This fungicide confers the seeds a purple color. 
Traditional varieties are never treated with fungicide and have instead a natural pale color.  
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experimental plot and not at the homestead. A total of seven plot visits were arranged. 
During these visits the research team ensured that only the seeds that were provided to 
the participants were grown in the experimental plot.14 The growing conditions were 
checked and more agronomic information on soil and agricultural practices were 
collected.15  Harvest from the experimental plot took place between July 2013 and 
August 2013. An end-line survey was also conducted to gather general information 
related to the harvest, agricultural inputs and practices used and on the social 
interactions between farmers and their network during the period of the experiment. 
To control for risk aversion a simple incentivized risk experiment as in Binswanger  
(1981) was also administered. The protocols of the field experiment and risk 
experiment are provided in a separate online appendix to this paper.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
The analysis aims to test whether farmers, having received improved seeds, modified 
some of their social interactions within their network. Our focus is on interactions that 
are more likely to make the others aware of their higher expected income either 
directly such as by discussing with others the seeds they have received or through on-
farm interaction. The first social interactions that capture this effect are discussions of 
the type of seeds received in the experiment and asking for help on the farm.  
We begin by testing if individuals in the treatment group reduce interaction within the 
network by simply telling a smaller number of their peers about the seeds they 
                                                             
14 A critical issue of this type of field experiments is the possibility of contamination with other type of 
seeds. 
15 The enumerators measured the experimental plot, recorded intercropping, mulching, the distance 
between plants, whether weeding took place, and if fertilizer was used. 
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received. We start with a simple regression where the dependent variable 𝐷𝑖 is the 
number of people in the village with whom farmer 𝑖 has discussed the type of seeds 
received.16 The exact survey question (previously reported on the footnote 6) is: with 
how many people in the village did you discuss the type of seeds since you received 
them?  The independent variable 𝑆𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if farmer 
𝑖 was randomly assigned to the improved seed group, otherwise (control group) is 
equal 0:  
𝐷𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 (1)  
where 𝑒𝑖 is the farmer 𝑖′s error term. We then add the network size in the village. This 
variable is constructed from the following survey question (previously reported on the 
footnote 7): how many of your relatives are living in this village? We further consider 
its interaction with the treatment (receiving improved seeds).17 This interaction allows 
measuring if the evasive response is sensitive to the size of the network. We thus, 
estimate the following:  
𝐷𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖 (2)  
where 𝑁𝑖 is the network size that farmer 𝑖 has in her village and 𝑁𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑖 is the 
interaction effect between the improved seeds dummy and the network size. We then 
consider the effect of the same set of explanatory variables on the number of people in 
the village to whom farmer 𝑖 has asked for help on the farm (defined as Ai). The exact 
                                                             
16 Please refer to Table 1 for a description of all the variables.   
17 It may be argued that the error term might be correlated with the social network size variable. 
Stratifying an exogenous treatment on endogenous variable, however, will yield valid estimate for the 
heterogenous effect. Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2014) have shown both analytically and with 
simulations that the OLS estimate of the interaction term in this context is still consistent if the 
(presumably) endogenous variable and the unobserved heterogeneity are jointly independent from the 
exogenous treatment. This is fulfilled thanks to the randomization of the allocation of the improved 
seed. As further check, we report in the appendix the estimated correlation between the interaction 
effect and the controls. We find no evidence of systematic and meaningful correlations. 
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survey question (also previously reported on footnote 6) is: since you received the 
seeds, how many people from your village did you ask for help on your farm?18  As 
above we test if the results are sensitive to the potential redistributive pressure that 
come from the size of the network. We therefore estimate the following equations: 
 𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖   (3) 
 
𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                            (4) 
In all the estimations we also add a large set of controls, region and village fixed 
effects. Controls include individual and farm characteristics such as age of the 
household head, household size, female-headed household (dummy), education 
(dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen (dummy) and labor. 
We control for important environmental and climatic conditions that may affect 
harvest. We, therefore, include dummies for pest damage and we capture differences 
in the climatic conditions including the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI- ARC2 
dataset).19 We also control for reciprocity by including a variable that captures the 
number of people in the village that have asked the participant for help on their farm 
during the period of the experiment (see table 1 for the exact survey question). This is 
potentially an important control as participants could ask for help with farming only 
                                                             
18 With high potential costs of not sharing resources – social stigma, social ostracism, evil eye (see, 
Platteau, 2000; 2014) – it is considered that subjects would not risk asking for help on any of their 
plots. With exposure comes increased likelihood that others might find out indirectly about the large 
positive expected increase in the harvest. Thus they would not strategically ask for support on some 
plots but not the experimental one. 
19 This index captures the rarity of a drought at a given time scale of interest for any rainfall station 
with historic data. It can also be used to determine periods of anomalously wet events. Being a 
standardized measure, it identifies normal conditions when close to zero. High SPI value corresponds 
to heavy precipitation event over time period specified while low SPI signal situations of low 
precipitation event. The lower the SPI the more dramatic is the drought. We used the GIS information 
to locate the farmers and then matched this information with rainfall data to produce the SPI.  
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because they want to be reciprocated or are already part of informal labor sharing 
agreements.  
Lowering labor inputs have the implication on the harvest amount. By asking for less 
help, farmers with improved seeds may thus not reap the full potential of the 
improved seeds. For instance, they would have less labor allocated to important 
agricultural practices such as soil preparation and weeding. Specifically, we test 
whether the positive harvest effect of improved seeds is sensitive to the potential 
redistributive pressure experienced by the farmer, as captured by the size of her social 
network. In order to test for this, we estimate a model similar to equation (2) except 
that the dependent variable is the harvest from the experimental plot instead of the 
number of people the participant discussed the seeds with or she asked for help.    
4. Empirical results  
Table 2 reports the results. The first two columns (a) and (b) report the results 
respectively for equations (1) and (2).  Column (c) reports the results after the 
inclusion of all the control variables. Columns (d) and (e) report the estimates for the 
equations (3) and (4). Last column (column (f)) reports the results after the inclusion 
of the full set of controls. The baseline results reported in columns (a) and (d) show 
that compared to the control group, individuals assigned the improved seeds reduced 
their network interactions that would make others aware of their expected large 
increase in harvest from the moment they received the seeds (by either avoiding to 
directly discuss their seeds or asking for help on their farm). The estimated coefficient 
for the treatment variable (positive harvest shock) is indeed negative and statistically 
significant (at 10%) in both baseline regressions.  
  [Table 2- About - here] 
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How does the size of the participant’s village network affect these results?  Column 
(b) and (e) in Table 2 present the results of the extended model including the effect of 
network size. We find that the effect of improved seeds on the number of people in 
the village with whom the seed type was revealed is sensitive to the size of the 
network. The effect of the size of the network is positive and significant. This 
captures the fact that the larger the network the larger the number of people with 
whom one can discuss the seeds or can be asked to work on the farm. The interaction 
between the size of the network and the positive harvest shock is negative and 
statistically significant. This implies that for the farmers in the treatment group, the 
larger the village social network the smaller the number of people in the village they 
discuss seed type with. This difference increases with network size. The same pattern 
applies to asking for help on the farm. These are important social interactions that 
would make the seeds and potential harvest more visible, thus exposing participants 
receiving a relatively large expected income shock to more redistributive pressure. 
Let us consider a situation in which a farmer normally asks someone in her social 
network to help with agricultural activities (e.g., land preparation, seeding, 
harvesting). If she has the improved seeds and she does not want to share harvest with 
all of them (i.e., she does not want to be taxed), she may ask only a smaller number of 
more trusted individuals. Perhaps, those individuals are less likely to diffuse the 
information about their expected harvest with the rest of the network. In general, we 
can envisage that while larger networks provide more opportunities to get valuable 
information and increase labor availability they may also trigger higher redistributive 
pressure. Our result highlights that in the presence of a relatively large harvest shock 
 15 
(improved vs. traditional seed) the cost of the social ties, captured by the 
redistributive pressure, dominates over the benefits of social ties.20  
Results are also quantitatively non trivial. Column (d), for instance, shows that on 
average, farmers with improved seeds asked 0.35 fewer people for help on the farm 
(significant at the 10% confidence level). Column (e) shows that the larger the 
network size, the fewer farmers with improved seeds asked for help on their plots. 
Estimated at the village network size sample mean value (10.5), farmers in the 
treatment group invited on average 0.2 fewer people to work with them. This number 
becomes much larger once we consider a larger network. To illustrate, farmers with a 
village network of 20 people would ask on average 0.5 fewer people to work in their 
farm, while farmers with a village network of 30 would invite 0.8 fewer people. To 
put things in perspective, it should be stressed that in a self-subsistence farming 
system, characterized by low technology adoption and zero mechanization, even 
small reduction in the labor inputs may have important implications. 
To probe the robustness of our results we add a large battery of controls, in addition to 
region and village fixed effects. Results are reported on columns (c) and (f) of Table 2 
and are consistent across specifications.  Moreover, in order to take into account the 
count data nature of the dependent variables and the large number of zeroes, we 
implemented a Poisson model.21 Results are shown in table A3 in the appendix and 
are found to be very comparable to the ones obtained with simple OLS.  
                                                             
20 Alternative explanations are also possible. For instance, it may be somehow related to the fact that 
output is produced by a new technology (improved seeds). We thank the anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out. 
 
21 It should be noted that the Poisson regression helps dealing with the skewness of the dependent 
variables of interest. 
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We now investigate the economic implications of this observed behavior of reducing 
a potentially profitable social interaction, such as asking for help on the farm. We test 
for this by comparing harvest output between farmers with improved and traditional 
seeds at various network sizes. Results are robust to different specifications and are 
presented in Table 3.  
[Table 3 – About here] 
On average, improved seeds increase expected harvest by 60%,22 as shown in column 
(a). Furthermore, the size of the network for farmers with traditional seeds increases 
the harvest by 4% for each additional member. This is coherent with the idea that the 
network provides some important services (e.g., information and labor resources). A 
different pattern emerges, however, for the treatment group. For farmers with a large 
social network (20 or more relatives in the village, i.e. 15% of the sample), the 
evasive behavior severely reduces the benefit of the improved seeds and can even 
completely cancel it out. These results are summarized in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1– About here] 
All regression results are presented with standard error robust to clustering at the 
village level and corrected for small cluster size (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 
2008). Alternative specifications with standard clustering procedures and robust 
standard errors provide very consistent results and are also presented in table A3. We 
also consider specifications with more interaction terms between controls affecting 
                                                             
22 The increase in the harvest found in our field experiment is much smaller than the one found in the 
agronomic trials implemented in the agricultural research stations (see for instance, Kanyeka, Kamala, 
and Kasuga, 2007). This is because that in the latter the growing conditions for the crop are optimal for 
instance in terms of soil moisture and nitrogen (Magorokosho, Vivek, and MacRobert, 2009). Our 
results are quite similar with a recent set of randomized controlled field trials undertaken by CIMMYT 
on this specific improved variety). The estimated productivity gain was between 70 and 90 per cent 
(Muricho et al., 2013) 
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the network size (e.g., household size, reciprocity, leadership, education and assets) 
and the treatment variables are included. Results are very consistent and available 
upon request. 
5.  Robustness checks and extensions 
We further probe our results for alternative explanations by undertaking a set of 
checks. We are particularly interested in probing the mechanism of evasive behavior 
in response to the increase in the expected harvest. We therefore estimate if a similar 
pattern would be found in other types social interactions that do not directly involve 
discussing the new seeds or viewing the plot. We first tested our hypotheses on four 
social interactions that would be unlikely to inform others what seeds were used, i.e. 
implying no direct visibility. These are largely those that do not take place on the 
participant’s experimental plot. These include general discussions on output markets, 
on land markets, and on farming practices (the detailed survey questions are reported 
on table 1). Results are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4 – About here] 
We do not find any sign of evasive behavior. Farmers with improved seeds do not 
differ from farmers with traditional seeds in the number of social interactions with no 
direct visibility. Furthermore, the effect of network size does not differ between 
control and treatment groups as shown by the lack of significance of the interaction 
term. Results suggest that evasive behavior does not take place in social interactions 
that do not increase the risk of incurring a redistributive family tax. Moreover, we test 
if the evasive behavior is found when we consider the social interaction with relatives 
living outside the village (see table 5 for the results). We find similar qualitative 
results when we consider whether they discussed the type of seeds they received.  
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 [Table 5 – About here] 
We find no statistical evidence of a similar effect on asking for help on the farm. This 
result highlights the importance of the visibility implied by the interaction with 
individuals living in the same village. One could argue that if the new improved seeds 
require less labor than traditional varieties then our interpretation could be muddied. 
Evidence suggests that in fact, the opposite effect may take place. Typically, 
improved varieties require more complementary inputs and more time invested in 
better agricultural practices, as well as optimal soil nutrients and moisture conditions 
to obtain very high yields (e.g., Byerlee and Polanco, 1986; Smale et al., 1995; Doss, 
2006). In order to fully exploit the productive advantage of the improved variety 
therefore more labor to undertake agricultural practices should be employed (e.g., in 
soil preparation, ploughing and weeding). We tested if treatment and control groups 
are statistically different in these agricultural practices, through simple differences in 
means, to rule out the hypothesis that improved seeds require less intensive farming 
practices. We find no evidence of such pattern. We report the results in the Table 6.  
  [Table 6 - about here] 
A critical issue is if the size of the network is an appropriate metric or proxy for the 
strength of redistributive pressure. A good proxy to capture the extent of sharing 
pressure experienced by the farmer at the village level is the answer to the question: 
How many people in this village are you expected to help if they asked you for help 
and they were in need? This is a measure of potential (and not actual) social 
interactions with other farmers living in the same village.23 We name this variable 
expected sharing pressure. Table 7 reports the results for the estimated models by 
                                                             
23 The survey question does not specify the degree of relationship, it only records if individuals are 
expected to help others in the village in case they would be in need. 
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using expected sharing pressure in place of network size.24 Results are largely 
consistent. In fact, the only regression where the dependent variable is the number of 
people with whom the type of seeds were discussed displays much larger standard 
errors.  
  [Table 7 - about here]  
We also provide in the appendix the results of robustness checks reported in Table 4 
using the expected sharing pressure variable in Table A4. Results are again very 
consistent with the pattern presented in Table 4. 
It should be noted that while village network size varies between 0 and 72 with an 
average of 10.5.  To probe the robustness of the results we re-run the analysis by 
using alternative transformations of our network measure. First, we discretize the 
network variable and recode it according to the percentile category (25, 50, 75, 99). 
Second, we take the log of network size (plus one to deal with the zeros). Results are 
consistent to those in table 2, illustrating changes in behavior that reveals seed type, 
as are reported in Table 8.    
  [Table 8 - about here] 
At this stage of the paper it is important to note that there are alternative 
interpretations that we cannot rule out for lack of appropriate data.25 For instance, 
while the new improved seed requires more labor in equilibrium, it may still deliver a 
higher yield with the same amount of labor that is optimal with the traditional seed. It 
                                                             
24 For consistency we report in the table A2 in the appendix the estimated correlation between the 
interaction effect between positive shock and expected sharing pressure and the controls. Again, we 
find no evidence of systematic and meaningful correlations. 
25 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. In a recent work, Squires (2016) for instance 
shows, with a lab experiment, that people from a Kenyan rural area have a strong preference for hiding 
their income to peers.  
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may not be, therefore, the fear of a redistributive family tax that prevents them from 
asking for help, but rather the fear of family pressure to work harder to deliver the 
maximum improved seed harvest gains. Hiding their seed type and accepting the yield 
of the improved variety under the more traditional labor input, may be a strategy to 
avoid this familial pressure. We also do not explore the role of envy from other 
people (also called “evil eye”) as a result of exploiting the improved seed variety. A 
large extended family implies greater repercussions motivated by envy, which could 
result in destruction of property or malicious gossip, or even witchcraft punishments 
(as documented by Gershman, 2015, 2016; Giblin, 2005 cited in Platteau, 2014).  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we present empirical evidence of the economic implications of 
redistributive pressure in the developing world. We implemented a set of field 
experiments that relied on the random assignment of improved seeds that greatly 
increase the expected maize harvest. We find that farmers receiving improved seeds 
interact less with their social network. The treated group is not only less likely to 
discuss with other farmers their seeds, but also ask less for help in the farm than the 
control group. This indicates that evasive responses may be made to avoid network 
redistributive pressures. Farmers that receive a relatively larger positive income 
shocks prefer to reduce their visibility by reducing involvement with their village 
rather than facing the risk of higher redistributive pressure and, as a result, obtained 
fewer harvest gains. These findings echo the work of Baland et al. (2011) where 
farmers in Cameroon were ready to incur a cost to avoid being taxed by their network. 
In the case presented in this paper, the cost is the forgone marginal productivity of 
labor on a plot with improved seeds. Hence, both studies highlight another 
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mechanism by which the dark side of redistributive pressure within social networks 
can compromise wellbeing: the inefficiency is not only due to disincentivized farmers 
free-riding on the solidarity of their peers, but to a suboptimal level of labor due to the 
fear of being subject to redistributive pressure. Although it is difficult to draw any 
conclusion on the long-term welfare equilibrium dynamics due to the cross-sectional 
nature of the present study, this implicit cost can be interpreted as the deadweight loss 
of the informal insurance system embedded in social networks. It is a deadweight loss 
because the additional food that could have been produced by marginally increasing 
labor will not exist. The social network will have fewer resources to share. 
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Table 1. Variables definitions and summary statistics 
Variable Definition and survey 
question 
Mean Standard Dev Min Max 
Number of 
people with 
whom the type 
of seeds were 
discussed  
Number of people in 
the village with whom 
the received seeds 
were discussed. 𝐷𝑖  in 
the equations (1) and 
(2). 
Survey question: With 
how many people in 
your village did you 
discuss the type of 
seeds since you 
received them? 
2.85 2.35 0.00 10.00 
      
Number of 
people you 
asked for help 
on your farm  
Number of people in 
the village the farmer 
asked for help on the 
farm. 𝐴𝑖  in the 
equations (3) and (4). 
Survey question: Since 
you received the seeds, 
how many people from 
your village network 
did you ask for help on 
your farm? 
1.9 2.76 0.00 20 
      
      
Network size  Number of relative in 
the village as measure 
of the social network. 
𝑁𝑖 in the equations (1), 
(2), (3) and (4). 
Survey question: How 
many of your relatives 
are living in this 
village? 
10.5 10.97 0.00 72 
      
      
Positive 
harvest shock  
Randomly assigned 
treatment status (1= 
improved variety; 
0=traditional variety). 
𝑆𝑖 in the equations (1), 
(2), (3) and (4). 
0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
      
      
      
Expected 
sharing 
pressure 
Number of people in 
the village you are 
expected to help.  
Survey question: how 
many people in this 
village do you expect 
to help, if they would 
be in need and if they 
2.13 3.79 0 30 
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asked you for help? 
 
      
Number of 
people with 
whom you 
discussed land 
market issues 
Number of people in 
the village with whom 
the farmer has 
discusses land market 
issues since the 
reception of the seeds. 
Survey question: Since 
you received the seeds, 
how many people in 
the village did you 
consult for information 
about land rental 
market (e.g., 
availability of 
tenants/landlords). 
0.84 1.31 0.00 5.00 
      
Number of 
people with 
whom you 
discussed 
agricultural 
practices 
Number of people in 
the village with whom 
the farmer has 
discussed farming 
practices since the 
reception of the seed.  
Survey question: Since 
you received the seeds, 
how many people in 
the village you 
consulted for 
information regarding 
farming practices, new 
technologies, use of 
modern inputs such as 
fertilizer, etc. 
0.89 1.12 0.00 5.00 
      
Number of 
people with 
whom you 
discussed land 
issues 
Number of people in 
the village with whom 
the farmer has 
discussed land issues 
since the reception of 
the seeds. Survey 
question: Since you 
received the seeds, 
how many people in 
the village did you 
consult for information 
about crop output 
markets 
0.88 1.34 0.00 5.00 
      
      
      
Harvest  Harvest from the 
experimental plot (in 
kilograms).  
82.20 72.48 0.00 280.00 
      
Network size 
outside the 
village  
Number of relatives 
outside the village. 
Survey question: How 
many of your relatives 
7.16 9.99 0.00 73 
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are living outside this 
village? 
      
      
Age of 
household 
head 
Age of household head 
(in years) 
44.07 10.08 16.00 70.00 
      
Household 
size 
Number of family 
members living under 
the same roof 
4.95 2.00 1.00 10.00 
      
Leadership 
role in the 
community  
If a member of the 
household has a 
leadership role in the 
community (1= Yes; 
0=otherwise) 
0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
      
Female headed 
household  
Gender of household 
head (1= Female; 
0=otherwise) 
0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
      
Secondary 
education  
Education level of 
household head. If 
household head 
completed secondary 
education after the 
primary (1= Yes; 
0=otherwise) 
0.60 0.49 0.00 1.0 
      
Risk averse  If plot 1 in the risk 
experiment is chosen 
(1= Yes; 0=otherwise) 
22% 0.41 0.00 1.00 
      
Farm size  Size of the operated 
plots from the 
household (in hectares) 
1.41 0.92 0.00 4.05 
      
Oxen  Do you own an ox? 
(1= Yes; 0=otherwise) 
23%    
      
Labor How many days in 
total have the members 
in your household 
worked on the 
experimental plot?  (In 
man days) 
8.25 4.83 0.00 22.00 
      
Pest damage  Did you experience 
pest damage on the 
experimental plot 
during the length of the 
experiment? (1= Yes; 
0=otherwise) 
23% 0.42 0.00 1.00 
      
Reciprocity Number of people in 
the village have asked 
the participant to help 
on their farm during 
the experiment. Survey 
1.7 2.95 0 20 
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question: Since you 
received the seeds, 
how many people from 
your village have 
asked you for help on 
their farm? 
      
Standardized 
Precipitation 
Index (SPI – 
ARC2) 
Measure of rainfall 
anomaly that could 
have been experienced 
in the village 
neighborhood. It is the 
amount of rainfall 
during the maize 
growing season minus 
the rainfall long term 
average,  divided by its 
standard deviation. 
0.22 0.66 -1.27 0.91 
      
Location 
South -East 
(1= Yes; 
0=otherwise)) 
Location South -East 
(1= Yes; 0=otherwise) 
41%    
      
      
 
Table 2: Social interactions in the village revealing the seed type 
 
Dep Vars Number of people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed the seeds received 
 Number of people in the village 
you asked for help on your farm 
 Baseline 
 
No 
controls 
 
Controls 
and 
village 
FE 
 
 Baseline 
 
No 
controls 
 
Controls 
and 
village 
FE 
 
 (a) (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) 
        
Positive harvest shock -0.66* 0.74 0.529  -0.35* 0.14 0.153 
 (0.37) (0.83) (0.685)  (0.21) (0.26) (0.239) 
        
Network size  0.15** 0.133***   0.06*** 0.0491** 
  (0.06) (0.0472)   (0.02) (0.0224) 
        
Positive harvest 
shock*Network size 
 -0.13* 
-0.125** 
 
 -0.04*** -0.0329* 
  (0.07) (0.0543)   (0.02) (0.0180) 
        
N 314 313 313  311 311 311 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis.  
Significance code: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Controls: age of the household head, household size, female headed household (dummy), education 
(dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen (dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH 
member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 
dataset), dummy for region. Constants not reported. 
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Table 3: Dependent Variable: Harvest (in logs) 
 Baseline 
 
No 
controls 
 
Controls 
 
Controls and 
village FE 
 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d)   
 
Positive harvest shock 
0.58*** 0.97*** 0.84*** 
0.920*** 
 
 (0.16) (0.25) (0.26) (0.224)  
      
Network size  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.0341***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.0129)  
      
Positive harvest 
shock*Network size 
 -0.03*** -0.03** 
-0.0362*** 
 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00963)  
      
N 309 308 308 308  
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis. 
Significance code: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Controls: age of the household head, household size, female headed household (dummy), education 
(dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen (dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH 
member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 
dataset), dummy for region. Constants not reported. Column (5) reports the results with network size 
(plus one to deal with the zeros) in logs.  
 
 
Table 4: Social interactions in the village not revealing the seed type 
Dep. Var: Number of people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed market issues 
Number of people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed agricultural 
practices 
Number of people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed land issues 
          
 Baseline No 
Controls 
Controls 
Village 
FE 
Baseline No 
Controls 
Controls 
Village 
FE 
Baseline No 
Controls 
Controls 
Village 
FE 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
          
Positive 
harvest shock 
0.53 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 -0.29 -0.31 0.13 -0.44 -0.44 
 (0.44) (0.72) (0.71) (0.28) (0.49) (0.42) (0.30) (0.44) (0.37) 
          
Network size  0.05*** 0.06***  0.06*** 0.06***  0.06*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
          
Positive 
harvest 
shock*Network 
size 
 0.06 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
  
          
N 313 313 313 313 313 313 313 313 313 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis. Significance code: 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Controls: age of the household head, household size, female headed household (dummy), education 
(dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen (dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH 
member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 
dataset), dummy for region. Constants not reported. 
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Table 5. Social interactions that reveal seed type outside the village 
Dep Var: 
Number of people outside the village 
with whom you discussed the seed 
type 
Number of people outside the village 
you asked for help on your farm  
 Baseline 
Controls and Village 
FE 
Baseline 
Controls and Village 
FE 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Positive harvest shock 0.301 0.169 -0.179 -0.157 
 (0.539) (0.500) (0.376) (0.362) 
     
Network size 0.156*** 0.133*** 0.0240 0.0238 
 (0.0406) (0.0453) (0.0198) (0.0151) 
     
Positive harvest 
shock*Network size 
-0.120*** -0.144*** -0.0230 -0.0285 
 (0.0363) (0.0421) (0.0297) (0.0311) 
     
N 312 312 310 310 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis. Significance code: 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Controls: age of the household head, household size, female headed household (dummy), education 
(dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen (dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH 
member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 
dataset), dummy for region. Constants not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Do the improved seeds require less complementary inputs?  T- test results. 
 Treatment Control 
Difference 
(Treatment – Control) 
p-value 
Soil preparation 2.16 2.14 0.02 0.88 
Weeding 1.49 1.45 0.04 0.65 
Intercropping 1.78 1.54 0.24 0.31 
Fertilizer / pesticides 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.91 
T-test on the means, null hypothesis H0: Difference=0 
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Table 7. Social interaction in the village, harvest and expected sharing pressure   
 Number of people in 
the village with whom 
you discussed the seeds 
received 
Number of people in 
the village you asked 
for help on your farm 
Harvest (in logs) 
 No controls Controls No controls Controls No controls Controls 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Positive harvest 
shock 
-0.689 -0.697 -0.128 0.102 0.710*** 0.721*** 
 (0.444) (0.458) (0.227) (0.0809) (0.166) (0.181) 
       
Expected 
sharing pressure 
0.0534 0.0392 0.0940 0.0802** 0.0482*** 0.0480** 
 (0.0786) (0.0831) (0.0710) (0.0314) (0.0185) (0.0196) 
       
Positive harvest 
shock*Expected 
sharing pressure 
-0.0293 -0.0182 -0.0925** -0.104* -0.0444** -0.0587** 
 (0.110) (0.104) (0.0393) (0.0542) (0.0198) (0.0280) 
       
N 300 299 300 298 295 294 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis. Significance code: 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls: age of the household head, household size, female 
headed household (dummy), education (dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen 
(dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized 
Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 dataset), village network size, dummy for region. All specifications 
with village fixed effects. Constants not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Other measures of network sharing pressure 
 
Dep Vars. 
Number of network 
members with whom you 
discussed the seeds received  
Number of network members 
you asked for help on your 
farm  
Harvest (in logs) 
Alternative 
Network 
measure 
Percentiles 
Log (network 
size+1) 
Percentiles 
Log (network 
size+1) 
Percentiles 
Log (network 
size+1) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
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Positive 
harvest shock 
0.472 0.779 0.428** 0.603*** 1.109*** 1.475*** 
 (0.719) (1.037) (0.178) (0.200) (0.280) (0.339) 
       
Network  1.002*** 1.029** 0.410** 0.370** 0.363*** 0.452*** 
 (0.333) (0.420) (0.190) (0.160) (0.0926) (0.113) 
       
Positive 
harvest shock* 
Network  
-0.809* -0.755 -0.426** -0.417*** -0.377*** -0.464*** 
 (0.460) (0.486) (0.188) (0.154) (0.0955) (0.102) 
       
N 314 313 311 311 309 308 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis. Significance code: 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls: age of the household head, household size, female 
headed household (dummy), education (dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen 
(dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized 
Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 dataset), dummy for region. All specifications include village fixed 
effects. Constants not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Harvest vs Size of network 
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Appendix 
In this appendix we provide four tables. Tables A1 and A2 are checks on the treatment 
randomization. Tables A3 and A4 are robustness check cited in Section 4 of the paper. 
 
 
Table A1. Balance check 
 Treatment Control 
Difference 
(Treatment – Control) 
Network size in the village 9.99 10.96 -0.97 
Network size outside the village 6.6 7.67 -1.06 
Expected sharing pressure 1.97 2.28 -0.3 
Risk averse 0.20 0.21 0.00 
Household size 5.2 5.04 0.17 
Land size (ha) 1.54 1.61 -0.07 
Oxen 0.23 0.22 0.00 
Labor 10.04 8.57 1.46* 
Female 0.09 0.14 -0.037 
Education 0.60 0.59 0.01 
Leadership role in the community 0.189 0.144 0.044 
Pest damage  0.179 0.26 -0.07 
Standardized precipitation Index  0.27 0.17 0.09 
Age of the household head 45.49 44.95 -0.45 
Been asked for help in other farms 
(reciprocity) 
1.77 1.72 0.05 
Standardized Precipitation Index 0.27 0.17 0.09 
T-test on the means, null hypothesis H0: Difference=0 
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Table A2. Correlation between the interactions and the controls 
 
Dep. Vars. 
 
Positive harvest shock 
*Network size 
Positive harvest 
shock* Expected 
sharing pressure 
 (1) (2) 
Age of the household head -0.00816 -0.0111 
 (0.0712) (0.0176) 
   
HH size -0.333 -0.147* 
 (0.233) (0.0821) 
   
Leadership role in the community 1.891 0.241 
 (1.768) (0.476) 
   
Female household head -1.397 -0.160 
 (1.402) (0.661) 
   
Education 1.547** 0.619 
 (0.731) (0.437) 
   
Risk Averse 0.680 -0.628** 
 (1.632) (0.269) 
   
Land 0.165 -0.0800 
 (0.374) (0.0925) 
   
Oxen -0.0955 0.135 
 (0.488) (0.229) 
   
Labor 0.115 0.0220 
 (0.0870) (0.0293) 
   
Pest damage 0.734 -0.0742 
 (1.709) (0.339) 
   
Standardized Precipitation Index 2.774 0.518 
 (2.991) (0.443) 
   
Reciprocity 0.281 -0.0273 
 (0.399) (0.0359) 
   
N 313 299 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis.  
Significance code: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All specifications include village and region 
fixed effects. Constants not reported. 
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Table A3: Social interactions in the village and harvest.  
Alternative estimators and standard errors 
 
 
Number of 
people in 
the village 
with whom 
you 
discussed 
the seed 
type 
Number 
of people 
in the 
village 
with 
whom you 
discussed 
the seed 
type 
Number of 
people in 
the village 
you asked 
for help on 
your farm  
Number of 
people in 
the village 
you asked 
for help on 
your farm  
Harvest 
 Poisson Robust 
standard 
errors 
Poisson Robust 
standard 
errors 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Positive harvest 
shock 
0.07 0.529 0.15 0.06 
0.920*** 
 (0.09) (0.758) (0.286) (0.12) (0.264) 
      
Network size 0.03*** 0.133** 0.0491*** 0.03*** 0.0341*** 
 (0.00) (0.0523) (0.018) (0.01) (0.0131) 
      
Positive harvest 
shock*Network 
size 
-0.03*** -0.125** 
-0.0329 
-0.02*** 
-0.0362** 
 (0.00) (0.0609) (0.0220) (0.01) (0.0161) 
      
Observations 313 313 311 311 308 
Columns (1) and (3) Village clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  Columns (2), (4), and (5) robust 
standard errors are used. Significance code: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
All specifications include as controls: age of the household head, household size, female headed 
household (dummy), education (dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen 
(dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), Standardized 
Precipitation Index (SPI - ARC2 dataset), dummy for region.  All reported results with village fixed 
effects. Constants not reported. 
 
 
Table A4. Social interactions in the village not revealing seed information and expected 
sharing pressure 
 
 
Number of people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed markets 
Number of people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed agricultural 
practices 
Number people in the 
village with whom you 
discussed land issues 
 No controls Controls  No controls Controls  No controls Controls  
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Positive harvest 
shock 
0.318 0.375 -0.0626 0.00631 0.0204 0.191 
 (0.538) (0.523) (0.150) (0.157) (0.169) (0.156) 
       
       
Expected sharing 
pressure 
-0.0340 -0.0396 0.0222 0.0241 0.0348 0.0313 
 (0.0308) (0.0347) (0.0323) (0.0306) (0.0218) (0.0239) 
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Positive harvest 
shock*Expected 
sharing pressure 
-0.0287 -0.0712 -0.0324 -0.0678* -0.0320 -0.0706** 
 (0.0758) (0.0787) (0.0423) (0.0382) (0.0394) (0.0341) 
       
       
N 299 299 299 299 299 298 
Village clustered and corrected for small cluster size standard errors in parenthesis.  
Significance code: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Controls: age of the household head, household size, female-headed household (dummy), education 
(dummy), risk aversion of the household head, land size, oxen (dummy), labor, reciprocity, HH 
member is the village leader, pest damage (dummy), village network size, Standardized Precipitation 
Index (SPI - ARC2 dataset). All specifications include village and region fixed effects. Constants not 
reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Online Appendix 
 
Experimental protocol and description 
We describe below the experimental protocol in more details.  We provide a description of 
the area where the survey sites are located, the seeds that were used in the experiments, the 
survey team and the data collection process. The protocol for the risk experiment is attached 
as well as the consent form and the survey instrument for collecting the information on social 
network and social interactions. 
 
Survey sites 
The data are based on a RCT implemented in the 2013 main growing season: January to 
August. Farmers are spread in three districts of Tanzania (Karatu, Mvomero and Kilosa, see 
map 1). These areas represent the main agri-ecological zones of Tanzania. Karatu, in the 
northern part of Tanzania, is located next to the natural Ngorongoro conservation area and to 
the tarmac road. This road brings numerous visitors each year to the Serengeti national park. 
Despite the proximity of this tourist attraction sites, farmers in the surrounding villages do not 
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benefit much from this flow of travellers as most do not stop in Karatu. The farmers who took 
part to the experiment in Karatu district live in three villages that are within 20 kilometers 
from each other. Each village belongs to a distinct agro-ecological zone: Changarawe is 
located at an altitude of 1350m-1450m with a dry climate; Kilimatembo and Rothia benefit 
from wetter conditions and are located at an altitude of 1500m-1600m and 1600m-1700m 
respectively. The farmers who took part to the field experiment in the East are scattered over 
two districts (Kilosa and Mvomero) and 13 villages. By contrast to the Karatu area, there are 
no tourist activities and these villages are far more remote from one another. The distance 
between each other may be up to 140 km. They are located at a lower altitude, between 500m 
and 1075m and are diverse in terms of humidity. Most are distant from any tarmac road and 
the closest village to the regional centre, Morogoro, is still more than 25 km away from it.  
 
2.1 Maize Seeds 
The improved seeds used in the study is called the Situka-M1. It was released in 2001 by 
Selian Agricultural Research Institute (SARI). It has a yield potential of 3-5 ton/ha and its 
optimal production altitude ranges from 1000 to 1500 meters above sea level. In Tanzania, 
Situka M1 can grow in the Eastern and Northern regions where our study areas are located. 
The variety is tolerant to drought, maize streak and grey leaf spot diseases, and resistant to 
Diplodia fungus, Fusarium leaf bright and Puccinia sorghi. Although its yields are often 
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advertised as 4 to 6 ton/ha by the government (Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and 
Cooperatives. 2009, cit. in Tumbo et al. 2012) or grain dealers (e.g. Suba Agro-Trading & 
Engineering Co. Ltd30). CIMMYT found considerably lower yields, from 2.4 ton /ha in a mid-
altitude dry environment to 4 ton/ha in a mid-altitude humid hot environment in a study of 
Magorokosho et al. 2009. Muricho et al., 2013 found also lower productive gains (between 
70% and 90% more than traditional varieties). In terms of adoption, Kassie et al. (2013) that 
one fifth of the farmers adopted improved maize seeds in the study area (20% in Karatu, 25% 
in Kilosa and 17% Mvomero) while Amare et al. (2012) report an adoption rate of 50% in 
Karatu. Maize accounts on average for 70% of crop production and constitute 80% of 
domestic food production consumption in the study area (Kassie et al. 2013). They found 
yields of 1 ton per hectare for adopters of improved maize varieties compared to 0.5 tonnes 
per hectare for local varieties. 
 
Implementation (step – by – step) 
The team in both areas was comprised of 15 trained enumerators employed on a regular basis 
by CYMMIT to collect data. They were supervised by one extension agent and the PI of the 
research project. The successful implementation of the experiment required the collaboration 
among the research team, the main agricultural extension officers operating in the regions and 
the village leaders in all the different stages of the experiment. 
In this appendix we report the exact timeline of the project: 
 In November 2012, the project leader met with the extension services in 
Morogoro and Arusha to discuss the possibility of an agricultural experiment 
in the regions. They were informed that the experiment would entail the 
distribution of maize seeds to a randomly selected group of farmers. No 
information was provided on the type of seeds or the network focus of the 
research.  
 In December 2012, two members of the research team and the extension 
service officers visited the sites and met the village leaders. From the leaders, 
we obtained the list of the households living in each village.  They were told 
that an agricultural experiment would take place the next rainy season. Co-
authors piloted with 5 households in the North and East area the baseline 
questionnaire. 
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 In early January 2013, the baseline survey was undertaken with the randomly 
selected households. Their consent to participate to an agricultural experiment 
that entailed the distribution of maize varieties was explicitly requested by the 
enumerator (consent form below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The baseline survey recorded all the relevant ex ante socio economic 
information, agricultural characteristics of the plots with a special focus on the 
maize plot. Each household provided information about the size of their social 
network (mapping of the network links), the type and frequency of social 
interactions, the potential extent of sharing pressure. The survey questions 
related to the social network are provided in the table 1 of the paper. Selected 
farmers were informed that they were among a small minority in the village to 
take part in an agricultural experiment that entailed the distribution of maize 
seeds. They were not informed who were the other farmers taking part in the 
experiment and the identity of the farmers who received the seeds was not 
revealed to the rest of the village. Farmers that were not part of the experiment 
were not informed about the research activities.  
 During the second half of January, improved maize seeds (Situka-M1) were 
bought at the Tanganyika Farmer Association, a seed dealer, and traditional 
seeds were bought to a local grain seller in both North and East regions. They 
were then discreetly distributed to the farmers in closed packages by the 
enumerators. Enumerators informed at the delivery what seed (improved or 
traditional) was provided to the farmers. The accuracy of this information was 
easily verifiable, as the type of seed is recognizable by eye. Improved seeds 
Survey Randomized Controlled Trial Maize July/August 2013 
Introductory Statement (to be read to the respondent):  
 
“We are coming from the University of Geneva (Switzerland) in collaboration with CIMMYT to talk 
to you about agricultural production. Your household was selected for this survey because you 
participated in a maize experiment. You have received seeds from our part in February. We will be 
asking questions about crop and livestock activities over the last 12 months of the farming year. We 
will also ask questions about your household’s access to information, and credit, your social network, 
your participation in community groups, and recent climate experiences or shocks. If you agree to 
participate, the information you provide will be used for research purposes only. Your answers will not 
affect any benefits or subsidies you may receive now or in the future. Your responses to these questions 
will be anonymous and remain strictly confidential. Your name will not appear in any data that is made 
publicly available. Do you consent to provide information for this study? You may withdraw from the 
study at any time and if there are questions that you would prefer not to answer then we respect your 
right not to answer them. 
Has consent been given? (01=Yes, 00=No) [ __ __ ] 
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have a smooth and regular shape. They are also of different color as they are 
treated with a fungicide to minimize seed loss during storage. This fungicide 
confers the seeds a purple color. Traditional varieties are not treated with 
fungicide and have instead a natural pale color.  
 In February 2013, at the beginning of the rainy season, farmers started 
planting the seeds on their experimental plots.  
 The first and last author of the paper visited the research areas 5 times until 
June in order to ensure that only the seeds that were provided to the 
participants were grown in the experimental plot. Each visit required around 2 
weeks of participation in the field-work. We also checked for growing 
conditions, collect mid-line data and pilot the end-line survey. The 
enumerators, first author and last author measured the experimental plot, 
recorded intercropping, mulching, the distance between plants, whether 
weeding took place, and if fertilizer was used. Meeting with participants were 
always held at the experimental plot and not at the homestead. In early June, a 
mid-line survey was administered: farmers where asked if they had planted the 
seeds, more agronomic information on soil and agricultural practices were 
collected and plot sizes were measured by the enumerators. The extensions 
agents trained groups of 5 enumerators at a time on measuring fields with tape 
measures. During the training, GPS devices were used by first and fourth 
authors to check the accuracy of land measurement. These co-authors piloted 
the end-line survey with 5 households in the Northern and in the Eastern area. 
 Harvest from the experimental plot took place between July 2013 and August 
2013. The end-line survey was conducted to gather general information related 
to the harvest, agricultural inputs and practices used and on the social 
interactions between farmers and their network during the period of the 
experiment. To control for participants’ risk aversion a simple incentivized 
risk experiment was also administered. The elicitation followed the method 
suggested by Binswanger (1981). We chose this task because of its simplicity. 
A payment was given as result of the risk experiment. The design of the task is 
provided below. 
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Risk preference experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please read the following: Imagine you can select 1 of 6 plots. On plot one, you earn 1000 
Tsh if the season is bad (HEAD) and also 1000 Tsh if the season is good (TAIL); on plot two 
900 Tsh if the season is bad or 1800 Tsh if the season is good; on plot three 800 Tsh or 2400 
Tsh; on plot four 600 Tsh or 3000 Tsh; on plot five 200 or 3600 Tsh and on plot six 0 or 
4000. In each plot, there is a one chance in two to get the bad and good harvest, that is: a good 
season is as likely as a bad season. Please, take a moment to compare the six different plots 
and then tell me which plot is the best for you.  
  
Show the boxes below to the farmers and explain him again how it works.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
200
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
3600 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
1000
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
1000 
 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
800
 
Good harvest 
(Tail) 
2400 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
900
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
1800 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
600
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
3000 
Bad harvest 
(Head) 
0
Good 
harvest 
(Tail) 
4000 
Plot  1.___ Plot  2.___ Plot  3.___ Plot  4.___ Plot  5.___ Plot  6.___ 
The respondent is asked to choose between the different farming plots (plot 1 to plot 6); Each plot 
gives either the bad harvest yield or a good harvest yield. For instance, plot 2 gives 900 Shillings if 
the season is bad (bad harvest), but it gives 1800 Shillings if the season is good (good harvest).  
